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Abstract
The relationship between home ownership of Dutch elderly households and age is strongly negative.
Other studies suggest that this age gradient should be attributed to a cohort eﬀect. In this paper we
investigate where those cohort eﬀects come from. We also observe that mortgage ownership among elderly
home-owners increased considerably during the nineties. Using panel data we estimate models explaining
home and mortgage ownership by age, cohort, and time eﬀects, as well as other factors. Cohort and time
eﬀects are modelled explicitly using macro economic and housing market related variables. We ﬁnd that
the level of GDP per capita when the household head was young is the main factor explaining generation
eﬀects in home ownership among the elderly. After accounting for cohort eﬀects it also appears that home
ownership decreases slightly with age. Mortgage ownership among elderly home owners rose considerably
during the nineties due to house price increases and due to ﬁnancial innovation in the mortgage market.
Cohort eﬀects are also important. A supplementary analysis suggests that those cohort eﬀects are due to
the fact that the accidental bequest motive is becoming less important.
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On observe une association fortement négative entre l’âge et la possession d’un logement 
parmi les ménages seniors néerlandais.  Certaines études suggèrent que cette association 
négative reflète l’existence d’un effet de cohorte. Dans cet article, nous examinons les 
sources potentielles de ces effets de cohorte. Nous observons également que le nombre de 
ménages seniors possédant un prêt immobilier a augmenté considérablement pendant les 
années 90. A l’aide de données longitudinales, nous estimons des modèles expliquant la 
possession d’un logement et d’un prêt immobilier en fonction de l’âge, de la cohorte, et 
de l’effet du temps, ainsi que d'autres facteurs. Les effets de cohorte et du temps sont 
explicitement modélisés par des variables macro-économiques et des variables 
directement liées au marché immobilier. Nous observons que le niveau du PIB par 
habitant, mesuré durant la période pendant laquelle le chef de ménage était jeune, est le 
facteur principal expliquant l’effet de cohorte de la possession d’un logement parmi les 
personnes âgées. Après avoir contrôlé pour l’existence d’un effet de cohorte, on trouve 
également que la possession d’un logement diminue légèrement avec l'âge. La détention 
d’un  prêt immobilier parmi les propriétaires de logement seniors a considérablement 
augmenté pendant les années 90 suite à la hausse du prix des logements et aux 
innovations financières sur le marché immobilier. Les effets de cohorte jouent également 
un rôle important. Une analyse complémentaire suggère que ces effets de cohorte sont 
dûs au fait que les motivations derrières les legs accidentels deviennent moins 
importantes. 1 Introduction
This paper examines, among other things, the degree to which Dutch elderly households reduce their home
ownership. There is considerable interest in the wealth holdings of the elderly, for several reasons. First of all,
due to population ageing, the elderly’s wealth position is of particular interest from a policy perspective. If the
elderly have not saved enough to sustain themselves in old age, this may have dramatic consequences for the
society as a whole. A second reason to be interested in the home ownership of the elderly is that it provides a
prima facie test of the life cycle hypothesis. This paper can be seen as a follow-up study to Alessie, Lusardi and
Kapteyn (1995) who have used panel data covering the period 1987-1991. Roughly speaking, they have found
that the median Dutch elderly household did not own a home at the beginning of the 1990s. Consequently, the
asset holdings of the median household were so small that they could ﬁnance consumption for a few months:
they only served as a buﬀer for adverse shocks. Consumption of the median retired household was ﬁnanced
through social security and occupational pension income.
The picture sketched by Alessie, Lusardi and Kapteyn (1995) has changed dramatically during the nineties.
Home ownership rates among elderly households in the Netherlands rose by more than ten percentage points
during that period. Nevertheless, the home ownership rate is still considerably lower than in other European
countries and the US. Moreover, the relationship between home ownership and age is rather peculiar in the
Netherlands: in 1990 approximately 54% of all households at age 55 and 30% around age 75 owns a house. Such
a strong age gradient is not observed in other developed countries. In the United Kingdom, the US and Italy
the average percentage of households with an own house is respectively 75%, 78% and 70% between age 50 and
59. This is still 57%, 75% and 66% between age 70 and 79 (Chiuri and Jappelli (2000)). Analysis on panel
data by Alessie and Kapteyn (2002) shows that the strong negative cross-sectional relationship between home
ownership and age among elderly Dutch households should be presumably attributed to a cohort eﬀect. This
ﬁnding suggests that on average the generations born after World War II (will) enter the retirement phase with
much more wealth than the generations born before 1930.1 If the younger generations retire, private wealth will
not only serve as a buﬀer for adverse shocks but can also be used for consumption purposes or for (intentional)
bequests. For policy analysis it is interesting to know where those strong cohort eﬀects in home ownership come
from and whether or not generations born after, say, 1960 will be predominantly home owners when they enter
retirement. In this paper we try to answer this type of questions. Using a panel data set covering the period
1990-2002, we explain those cohort eﬀects by means of macro economic and housing market related variables.
One important cohort eﬀect might stem from the fact that due to productivity growth younger generations have
a higher lifetime income (permanent income) than the older ones. Like Kapteyn, Alessie and Lusardi (2005),
we try to capture this productivity growth eﬀect by means of real GDP per capita level when the household
head was young (between age 23 and 27).
We also consider housing market conditions around age 25 as measured by the supply of the new houses in
the rental and owner occupied sector respectively. Due to the highly regulated housing market policies, housing
market conditions at young ages might have had a long term eﬀect on the home ownership status at a later
stage of the life cycle.2 Just after World War II there was a large housing shortage. Therefore, the government
planned to build many subsidised dwellings in a short period. Until 1975, the annual number of newly built
rented dwellings was larger than the production of owner-occupied houses. Consequently, many households born
in the 1920s, 1930s (and 1940s) mainly ended up in a rental dwelling when they were young. Rents of subsidised
dwellings were and are still low due to the highly regulated policies by the central and local governments. Given
these low rents, it might have been attractive for the older generations not to move to an owner occupied house
at an older age, even in the case that household income has increased considerably. According to criteria set
by the government approximately a quarter of all tenants should, regarding their income, not occupy a council
house (this number refers to 1989, see Ministry of Housing (1999)). From the 1990s onwards, government policy
is geared towards stimulating home ownership. Consequently, in the nineties the number of newly built owner
occupied dwellings is considerably larger than the number of new houses in the rental sector.
We are also interested in the question whether retired households use their housing wealth to ﬁnance con-
1This older generation has been investigated by Alessie, Lusardi and Kapteyn (1995).
2In order to investigate this long term eﬀect in more detail, we also estimate the home ownership equation on a subsample
consisting of those household with a head who is at least 50 years old.
2sumption as predicted by the life cycle model (see Deaton (1992) and Hurd (1989) for an overview of the life
cycle model). One of the ways to cash housing wealth for consumption purposes is to sell the house and to rent
afterwards. Therefore it is interesting to investigate the relationship between home ownership and age after
having corrected for cohort eﬀects.
Instead of becoming a renter, elderly home owners could ﬁnance consumption by taking up a mortgage. In
this paper we show that during the nineties mortgage ownership among elderly home owners increased even
more dramatically than home ownership. Moreover, it appears that mortgage redemption between the age of
60 and 70 is less popular than one might expect. The increase in mortgage ownership among elderly home
owners are not only due to cohort eﬀects. Macro-economic and institutional changes which took place during
our sample period (1990-2002) could also have played a role. The 1990s (and especially the second half of the
1990s) witnessed a high economic growth, low real interest rates and large increases in house prices. Moreover,
new mortgage types were introduced which exploit as much as possible the tax deductibility of mortgage interest
payments.3
In our analysis of the home ownership and mortgage decision we should take into account that in 1993 banks
relaxed the mortgage qualiﬁcation constraint for two earner couples. Before that year, banks typically considered
only the income of the husband in determining the maximum allowable mortgage loan. From 1993 onwards,
banks also take the earnings of the wife into account (Van Assenbergh (1998)). Obviously, such (institutional)
changes might have aﬀected households’ decisions concerning home and mortgage ownership. Furthermore, we
should account for the fact that large increases in the housing wealth appear to stimulate the take up of second
mortgages among elderly (Rouwendal and Alessie (2002)), (Haﬀner (2005)). Groeneveld and de Haas (1999)
mention ’a reduction in the Calvinism’ in the investment and ﬁnancing behaviour as a possible explanation for
this phenomenon.
The study is organized as follows. In the next Section we present the data and show that mortgage ownership
among elderly home owners has increased by about 10% between 1990 and 2002. In Section 3 we present the
reduced form model that accounts for cohort, time and age eﬀects as well as socio-economic related variables.
Section 4 shows the empirical results. In Section 5 we further explore the cohort eﬀects related to the changes
in mortgage ownership. We end with the conclusions in Section 6.
2 Data
For the analysis of home and mortgage ownership we mainly use data which stems from the Dutch Social
Economic Panel (SEP). The SEP is a longitudinal survey which is administered by Statistics Netherlands
(CBS) between 1984 and 2002. It consists of approximately 4600 households per year. The aim of the SEP is
to provide a description of the most important elements of individual and household welfare, and to monitor
changes in these elements over time. The SEP questionnaire includes detailed questions on income, wealth (as of
1987), labour force participation, demographics etcetera. The sample is representative of the Dutch population
excluding those living in special institutions such as nursing homes. We only use data from 1990 to 2002,
because in 1990 CBS revised the income questions dramatically. For further information on the data, see e.g.
Alessie, Kapteyn and Klijn (1997).
The SEP dataset does not contain enough information to explain the observed cohort and time eﬀects in
mortgage ownership among the elderly (see below). Therefore we also perform some additional analysis on data
sponsored by the Nederlandsche Bank (DNB). The DNB Household Survey (DHS) was formerly known as the
CentER panel or VSB panel. Nyhus (1996) describes this data set and its general quality. From 1993 onwards,
the DHS-data are collected by CentERdata on an annual basis. The DHS-data covers about 2000 households
each year. 4 The survey contains interesting questions on the housing situation of a household and its savings
and bequest motives. Unfortunately, compared with the SEP the attrition rate in this panel is rather high: on
3Up to 1999, all mortgage interest payments were tax deductible. In 2000 the tax authorities curtailed the deductibility a bit.
Interest payments are not anymore tax deductibility if the mortgage is used to ﬁnance stock market operations or durable goods
(such as a car or sailing boat). In 2002, the tax authorities curtailed the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments somewhat
further.
4The DHS-survey is an internet survey. In the DHS, higher income deciles are somewhat over-represented. We correct for this
by using sample weights.
3average, a household participates in the DHS for a period of 3.7 years. The corresponding number in the SEP
is 6.1 years.
We select a sub-sample of households of which the head is between 25 and 80 years old. We delete the 80+
observations in order to prevent possible problems due to diﬀerential mortality. Since rich households tend to
live longer the relationship between age and home (mortgage) ownership may be biased, especially in later life
(Hurd (1990)).
2.1 Descriptive analysis
In Figure 1, we present age and cohort patterns of the home ownership rate based upon thirteen waves of the
SEP (1990-2002). We use ﬁve year-of-birth cohorts, with birth years 1917-1921 for the oldest cohort until birth
years 1962-1966 for the youngest cohort. Cohort labels indicate the middle year-of-birth of the household head.
The thirteen points for each cohort represent the home ownership rate at thirteen age levels, and form a ’cohort
curve’. For each cohort, these thirteen points are interconnected. Jumps between cohort curves show that,
apart from age eﬀects, there are cohort or time eﬀects.5 The fact that cohort curves are not horizontal shows
that there are time and/or age eﬀects; the fact that not all cohort curves are the same shows that there is
more than just time eﬀects. As usual, however, cohort, time and age eﬀects cannot be disentangled without
further assumptions. In the discussion below and in the econometric analysis (see Section 4) we ignore time
eﬀects. This assumption implies that home ownership is not aﬀected by business cycle shocks during the sample
period.6 Basically, we assume that business cycle shocks are unanticipated and therefore independent of all
explanatory variables. In other words, we assume that the business cycle shocks are part of the error term in
the model.
A ﬁrst glance at Figure 1 suggests that the age-home ownership proﬁle has a hump shaped form: home
ownership increases up to the age of 55 and gradually declines with age afterwards. The vertical diﬀerences
between the curves indicate diﬀerences in home ownership between cohorts at the same age. Those diﬀerences
are sometimes large, indicating strong cohort eﬀects in home ownership. For instance, from all households of
which the head was born between 1932 and 1936, approximately 52% owned a house at the age of 56. This rate
has increased to 63% for those born between 1937 and 1941 at the same age. So, there is a diﬀerence in home
ownership of more than 10%-points between two adjacent cohorts.
Not surprisingly, the increase in home ownership is matched by a rise in mortgage ownership. It is more
interesting to analyse the probability of having at least one mortgage outstanding on its current dwelling
conditional upon home ownership.
Figure 2 plots the cross-section relationship between mortgage ownership rate among home owners and age
in 1990 and in 2002. In this ﬁgure people younger than forty are not considered: young home owners typically
have an mortgage outstanding. Figure 2 clearly shows that between 1990 and 2002 the fraction of elderly home
owners with a mortgage debt increased considerably: in 2002, 72% of all home owners aged 65 still had a
mortgage. In 1990 this percentage was considerably lower, namely 45%. Such cohort-time eﬀects are hardly
observed before the age of 50.
Similar to Figure 1, Figure 3 shows diﬀerences in mortgage ownership over age and between diﬀerent cohorts
of home owners. Contrary to the econometric analysis of home ownership, we argue that time eﬀects should
be taken into account when explaining mortgage ownership. The introduction of new mortgage types and
the increased liberalisation of the mortgage market during the sample period could have aﬀected household’s
mortgage behaviour. However, the inclusion of time eﬀects leads to an identiﬁcation problem, since we can no
longer disentangle cohort, age and time eﬀects. Surprisingly, Figure 3 shows no clear evidence for an age-time
5Time eﬀects are changes that occur during the sample period and that aﬀect all households in the sample in the same way
each period.
6In a sensitivity analysis, we have checked the validity of this assumption by adding time speciﬁc variables such as growth in
real GDP per capita, real interest rate and house prices (in real terms). This does not aﬀect dramatically our results on home
ownership reported in Subsection 4.1. For instance, the age coeﬃcients and the eﬀect of the cohort variables on home ownership do
not change much by adding the time speciﬁc variables (see Van der Schors, Alessie and Mastrogiacomo (2007) for more details on
the sensitivity analysis). Moreover, it should be mentioned that the econometric model takes the whole of transitory income into
account. Transitory income could partly capture business cycle eﬀects. However, we do not include a full set of time dummies. Also
in other empirical studies on home ownership, for example (Chiuri and Jappelli (2006)), time eﬀects are not taken into account.
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Explanatory note: non-parametric regression technics (lowess smoothing) has been used to estimate the relationship between age
and mortgage ownership.
Source: SEP, own computations.























































Source: SEP, own computations.
eﬀect. We do not see a clear decline in mortgage ownership with age for all cohorts as common wisdom would
suggest.
From the descriptive analysis presented above we do not really explain the cohort and time eﬀects in home
and mortgage ownership. In the next section we present a panel data model which can be used for this purpose.
3 Econometric Model
We analyse the home and mortgage ownership using a random eﬀect linear probability model. In order to relax
the stringent assumptions of the random eﬀect model, we allow for correlation between unobserved household
eﬀects and the explanatory variables by adding household speciﬁc averages of the time varying regressors to
the model (Mundlak (1978)). We also control for possible sample selection biases -due to panel attrition- by
including selectivity dummies. This leads to the following model, explaining home ownership of household h
belonging to cohort c in period t:









hζ + ωh + εh,t (1)
where the selectivity dummy SDh,τ takes on the value one if the household participates in year τ and participates
at least one more time in the survey after period τ (τ = 1990,...,2001). Otherwise the dummy is equal to
zero. If the selectivity dummies are jointly signiﬁcant, there is an attrition bias problem. The age eﬀect, PI
i=1 δisi(ageh,t), is modelled by means of a linear spline function with 10 knots at ages 30, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60,
65, 70, 75 and 80. The δ-coeﬃcients reﬂect the marginal eﬀect of becoming one year older for the ages within
each interval.
In our approach, we explicitly model the cohort eﬀects by means of a vector of cohort speciﬁc variables Zc.
We assume that cohort eﬀects are driven by productivity diﬀerences and by the situation on the real estate
market at the time the household head entered the housing market which we take to be around age 25.7 As
7For each household the value belonging to each cohort variable is an average of the values of the cohort variable in the years
in which the head is 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. We admit that this choice is slightly arbitrary. Therefore we experimented with age
6we already mentioned in the introduction, we have included three cohort variables in equation (1). The ﬁrst
one reﬂects the economic situation using the log(GDP per capita).8 The other two variables are the logarithm
of the amount of newly built houses in the owner-occupied and rental sector respectively, expressed per head
of the population between the age of 20 and 30. We have to point out that the exact number of newly built
houses (by ownership type) is not available before 1960. We have imputed the unavailable data on the base of
data concerning new constructions and the number of new rented and owner-occupied houses. 9 A sensitivity
analysis shows that small adjustments in the extrapolation technique do not lead to signiﬁcant changes of our
results. In order to correct for residual trending cohort eﬀects, the vector Zc also includes a cohort trend variable
(log year of birth). This variable has no speciﬁc economic interpretation; it only corrects for possible spurious
correlations. Ideally, one would have liked to add more cohort speciﬁc variables such as the stock of houses by
ownership type instead of the new supply. However, we need time series from 1930 onwards and time series for
those variables are hardly available.
The Xh,t vector consists of variables like income, marital status and a dummy variable for being a two-earner
household after 1993. The latter reﬂects the relaxation of credit restrictions in the Netherlands. Wh is a vector
of time invariant and individual speciﬁc variables, like gender, education level and households speciﬁc averages
of Xh,t. The individual eﬀect ωh is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the right-hand side variables
of equation (1). The error term εh,t is assumed to be uncorrelated with all right-hand side variables in all time
periods. In our estimation procedure we correct the standard errors for intra-household correlation.
The model for mortgage ownership diﬀers in one respect from that of home ownership. Cohort eﬀects
are not explicitly modelled. Instead aggreagate time eﬀects are taken into account. Speciﬁc diﬀerences are
explained in the discussion of the estimation results for mortgage ownership. Evidently, the two models are
highly interrelated as the model explaining mortgage ownership is estimated on the subsample of home owners.
This selection might generate a bias in the estimation results. Ideally, we would like to correct for this by means
of a Heckman selection bias model. However, we do not dispose of exclusion restrictions, because the decisions
to buy a house and negotiate a mortgage are taken jointly.
4 Results
4.1 Home ownership
Table 1 shows the estimation results for the home ownership model. In Model 1 all households aged 25 to
80 are taken into account (N=57212). In Model 2, on the right panel of the table, only those households are
selected whose head is older than 50 (N=23941). We also consider this subsample in order to investigate in
more detail the claim that the housing market at young ages has a long term eﬀect on home ownership. The
lower part of the table reports ﬁve tests of joint signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables. The joint signiﬁcance
of the household speciﬁc averages of the time varying variables, like income, conﬁrms our speculation that the
unobserved eﬀects are correlated with time-varying characteristics. The fact that the selectivity dummies are
jointly signiﬁcant in Model 1 (χ2(12) = 28.35) shows that attrition does not take place randomly. In Model
2 however the selectivity dummies are not jointly signiﬁcant. Therefore we re-estimated this model without
including those dummies.
The estimation results for Model 1 suggest that the probability to be home owner increases with 6.4%-points
each year in the youngest age group, while it declines with about 0.3%-points per annum after age 65, ceteris
paribus. The estimation results for the 50+ subsample also suggest a decline in home ownership after retirement.
The eﬀect is somewhat larger than in model 1: from the age of 65, we ﬁnd an annual decrease in ownership of
ranges (e.g. by taking the ranges 21-25, 25-29 and 21-29 instead of 23-27). The estimation results are barely aﬀected by the choice
of age range (see Van der Schors, Alessie and Mastrogiacomo (2007) for more details).
8GDP in prices of 1990.
9The information on dwellings built by the (local) government, the housing corporations and private individuals/organisations
as well as the total newly built houses is also available before 1960. The annual number of new rented houses is elicited by adding
up the new houses owned by the government, the housing corporations and 3/10 built by private parties. The remainder, 7/10 of
all private houses, represents the supply of new houses in the owner-occupied sector. After 1960, the exact number of newly built
rented and owner-occupied houses is known. The fractions of 3/10th and 7/10th are estimated on basis of data after 1960.
7about 0.6%-points. Whereas the direction of the age eﬀects are approximately the same for the two samples,
the eﬀect of the other variables dramatically diﬀers between Model 1 and 2.
In both models the cohort variables are jointly signiﬁcant at a 1% signiﬁcance level (respectively χ2(3) = 87.3
and χ2(3) = 52.6). This suggests that the economic and housing market situation at the potential age of entry
into the housing market partly determines whether or not a household eventually will become a home owner.
In Model 1, a 1% increase in the supply of new owner-occupied houses per head of the population between
age 20 and 30 leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the home ownership rate of 0.09%-points. A 1% increase in
the supply of new rented houses decreases the probability to be home owner by 0.12%-points. These opposite
eﬀects indicate that the composition of the stock of newly built houses when the household’s head is around age
25, aﬀects a household’s ﬁnal position on the housing market. In the Netherlands, the housing supply is highly
regulated. Although the housing shortage has decreased in the last few decades, there is still a discrepancy
between the demand and supply for (owner occupied) houses, especially for some speciﬁc types and locations
(Boelhouwer (2005)). Since (semi-)public institutions have a large say in the construction of new houses in the
owner-occupied and rental sector, they have a large inﬂuence on home ownership. Our results indicate that
an increase in the new supply of houses in the owner-occupied sector enhances starters’ opportunities to buy a
house. In this way, the excess demand for owner-occupied housing is diminished.
Contrary to our expectations, a 1% increase in the GDP level per capita leads to a decrease in the home
ownership rate.10 However, this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. A possible explanation for this result is the
fact the cohort trend variable is highly signiﬁcant. The cohort trend variable appears to be highly correlated
with GDP per capita (correlation coeﬃcient = 0.971). The high signiﬁcance of the cohort trend variable signals
the presence of unobserved, trending cohort eﬀects. One of such trending cohort eﬀects could be the house
prices (relative to the rents) at the moment of entering the housing market.
Total household income appears to have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on home ownership. Notably, we can
make a distinction between the eﬀect of permanent and transitory income: the household speciﬁc average of
log(income), (log(income)), serves as a proxy variable for permanent income. However, we should be careful
with interpreting the variable. For the elderly subsample the permanent income consists of thirteen years of
income after retirement. This underestimates a household’s real permanent income. In Model 1, a 1% increase
in permanent income leads to a rise in the home ownership rate of 0.11%-points.11 The transitory income
component has a small, but signiﬁcant eﬀect on home ownership. In Model 2 only the variable measuring
the household’s speciﬁc average of log(income), (log(income)), contributes positively to the probability to be
home owner (0.12%-points). On basis of the Model 1 results we ﬁnd that for two-earner households after 1993,
the probability to be home owner signiﬁcantly increases, ceteris paribus, by 3.0%-points. The three variables
that measure the eﬀect of being a two-earner household after 1993 are jointly signiﬁcant at a 1% signiﬁcance
level (χ2(3) = 33.87) It suggests that the relaxation of credit constraints for two-earner households increases
their chances to buy a house (at the cost of one-earner households). However, the three indicators are not
jointly statistically signiﬁcant if we consider the 50+ sample. Also the individual dummy variable that indicates
whether or not a household is a two-earner household after 1993 is insigniﬁcant for this subsample. Apparently,
many of the elderly two-earner households do no longer plan to become home owner because of the two-earner
rule.
If we only take the elderly households into account (cf. Model 2), the eﬀect and signiﬁcance of the cohort
variables strongly deviate from those in Model 1. Model 2 does not contain a cohort trend, since the coeﬃcient
estimate of this variable did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero. In Model 2 the two housing supply variables
around age 25 are no longer signiﬁcant. This suggests that the housing market conditions when entering the
housing market have no eﬀect on home ownership for the elderly sample. On the other hand, the GDP per
capita around age 25 is highly signiﬁcant. A 1% increment in the GDP per capita increases home ownership
by 0.18%-points.12 Possibly, the initial macro economic situation aﬀects the income situation of a household
10We also performed a sensitivity analysis in order to check whether business cycle shocks at young ages matter. In other words,
we added the variable ’real growth in GDP per capita’ around age 25 as an extra regressor in the model (next to GDP in levels). In
both the full and the 50+ sample this extra variable was not statistically signiﬁcant (see Van der Schors, Alessie and Mastrogiacomo
(2007)).
11The eﬀect of the permanent income on home ownership is equal to the coeﬃcient of income variable itself (transitory component)
plus the coeﬃcient of the variable related to the household speciﬁc average of income.
12We examined the eﬀect of including the GDP growth as an additional cohort variable, to account for the eﬀect of changes in












































































































































































Explanatory note: the ﬁgure is based on the estimation results from Model 1 (whole sample). The vertical axis is normalized to
zero in year 1926.
Source: own computations.
























































































































































Explanatory note: the ﬁgure is based on the estimation results from Model 2 (ages between 50 and 80). The vertical axis is
normalized to zero in year 1910.
Source: own computations.
9in later periods and hence the opportunities to buy a house. This is quite plausible, despite the fact that we
have already included proxy variables for transitory and permanent income. Those proxy variables might be
imperfect, since the permanent income proxy only takes the income of thirteen years into account. For most
elderly households (i.e. the households considered in Model 2) this means that the permanent income is an
average of mainly pension income, which is expected to be lower than the income during working life. The GDP
cohort variable, on the contrary, reﬂects the eﬀect of being born (and raised) in a speciﬁc period with speciﬁc
economic conditions, for example in the period before World War II or just after 1945.
Figure 4 shows the joint eﬀect of the cohort variables by year of birth on basis of the results of Model 1.13
The cohort eﬀect is normalised to zero for the ﬁrst year of birth in the graph (1926). Between birth years
1926 and 1960 we do not observe a clear pattern. From 1960 onwards, we see strong positive cohort eﬀects:
comparing the 1966 and 1978 generations, there is a diﬀerence of 10%-points in the home ownership rate. On
the base of Figure 4 it seems that the cohort variables only explain diﬀerences in home ownership between
younger generations of households, consistent with our speculations above. Figure 5 shows the eﬀect of the
cohort variables when we use the coeﬃcients estimated in Model 2. Notice that in Figure 5 the cohort eﬀect
is mainly driven by the GDP variable. Contrary to Figure 4, Figure 5 suggests positive cohort eﬀects among
the elderly cohorts: the probability to be home owner is 15%-points higher for households with a head born in
1950, compared to those born in 1930.
Altogether, the fact that the estimation results of Models 1 and 2 diﬀer dramatically suggests that in Model
1 interactions between cohort variables and age should be taken into account. Consequently, we think that
the results based on the 50+ subsample describe more adequately the cohort eﬀects of the elderly households.
To check whether the three cohort speciﬁc variables satisfactorily describe the cohort eﬀects, we include a
full set cohort dummies to the model (results not displayed).14 If the coeﬃcients corresponding to the cohort
dummies are jointly insigniﬁcant, the included cohort variables explain most of the cohort eﬀects. It appears
that the cohort dummies are not jointly signiﬁcant at a 1% signiﬁcance level (χ2(37) = 30.24). So, for the 50+
subsample, it seems that the GDP per capita and the two housing supply variables at the potential age of entry
on the housing market describe most cohort eﬀects.
4.2 Mortgage ownership
Table 2 summarises the estimation results of the model explaining mortgage ownership. In this analysis we only
select home owners older than 50 because we do not expect respondents to be able to redeem their mortgage
at younger ages (see Figure 2 in Section 2). This reduces the sample to 11533 observations, which refer to 2223
households. The models explaining mortgage ownership and home ownership diﬀer in several respects. First,
we do not explicitly model generation eﬀects, because we could not ﬁnd appropriate cohort speciﬁc variables
and the relevant data. Instead, we use a linear spline function of year of birth which contains six knots. The
second diﬀerence is that we account for time eﬀects in explaining mortgage ownership. By including time
dummies to measure the time eﬀect, we would run into the well-known identiﬁcation problem: because of the
identity calender year = age + year of birth, one cannot disentangle age, cohort and time eﬀects. We solve
this identiﬁcation problem by explicitly modelling the time eﬀect by means of the inﬂation rate and the real
average house price during the sample period. 15 Finally, the model explaining mortgage ownership includes
two extra household speciﬁc variables. One regressor reports the value of one’s house relative to the average
house price at the housing market. 16 The other one indicates the length of residence in the current home. In
our econometric model we do not take into account that the possibility to deduct mortgage interest payments
the economic situation. Because this potential cohort variable was not signiﬁcant in any of the estimations (see Van der Schors,
Alessie and Mastrogiacomo (2007)), we decided not to include this variable.
13The joint eﬀect is computed by multiplying for each year of birth the coeﬃcient of each of the cohort variables by the value of
the cohort variables. Afterwards, we take the sum of the three multiplications for each year of birth. In computing the joint eﬀect,
we do not take the cohort trend variable into account.
14To avoid perfect collinearity problems (we included 3 cohort speciﬁc variables), we need to drop arbitrarily 3 cohort dummies.
15We have obtained data on the average house prices from the Dutch foundation of real estate agents (Nederlandse Vereniging
voor Makelaars). The prices are corrected for inﬂation each year.
16These values are expressed in prices of 1990.Table 1: Estimation results on home ownership for two diﬀerent age groups
Model 1 Model 2
Parameter St. err. Parameter St. err.
estimates estimates
Cohort variables
1: Supply of newly owner-occupied
houses per capita 0.09 *** 0.015 0.017 0.016
2: Supply of newly built rented
houses per capita -0.12 *** 0.013 -0.00 0.016
3: Absolute level of GDP per capita -0.07 0.055 0.17 *** 0.033
Log (income) 0.009 *** 0.002 0.0009 0.002
Log(income) 0.096 *** 0.007 0.1163 *** 0.013
Two-earner household (yes=1) 0.001 0.008 -0.0001 0.012
Year after 1993 (yes=1) -0.01 0.0 -0.008 0.004
Two-earner after 1993 (intro two-earner rule) 0.030 *** 0.009 0.0069 0.012
Intermediate education 0.046 *** 0.012 0.008 0.022
Higher vocational and university education 0.080 *** 0.013 0.08 *** 0.021
Family size 0.021 *** 0.004 0.013 * 0.008
Marital status (ref.group = single, never married)
Married (yes =1 ) 0.111 *** 0.019 0.0243 0.023
Divorced (yes = 1) 0.03 0.026 -0.06 * 0.034
Widow (yes = 1) 0.101 *** 0.027 0.0042 0.019
Sex (male = 1) 0.089 *** 0.014 0.0611 ** 0.025
Age splines
25 to 30 0.064 *** 0.004
30 to 40 0.022 *** 0.001
40 to 45 0.008 *** 0.002
45 to 50 0.01 *** 0.002
50 to 55 0.0068 *** 0.002 0.0048 ** 0.002
55 to 60 0.006 ** 0.002 0.0040 0.002
60 to 65 0.002 0.002 -0.0002 0.002
65 to 70 -0.002 * 0.002 -0.004 *** 0.001
70 to 75 -0.003 ** 0.002 -0.005 *** 0.002
75 to 80 -0.003 0.002 -0.006 *** 0.002
Cohort trend variable 0.43 *** 0.072
Constant term -2.9788 0.469 -2.328 *** 0.34
N 57212 23941
Joint signiﬁcance (chi square test):
household speciﬁc averages χ2
7= 303 *** χ2
7=99 ***
Age splines χ2
10= 525 *** χ2
6=32 ***
Income variables χ2
2= 211 *** χ2
2=77 ***
Cohort variables χ2
3= 85 *** χ2
3=53 ***
Selectivity dummies χ2
12=28 *** not included
Explanatory note: Model 1: all ages between 25 and 80. Model 2: 50 plus respondents. Signiﬁcance levels ***
= 1% ; ** = 5% ; * = 10% . We do not present the estimated coeﬃcients of the household speciﬁc averages, except
from the time average of log(income). The cohort trend variable is a log trend based on year of birth. We dropped the
cohort trend variable from Model 2 because of non signiﬁcance.
The selectivity dummies are jointly signiﬁcant in the total sample, but not in the 50+ model. Therefore, they are
included in Model 1 and dropped in Model 2.
Source: SEP, own computations.
11from taxable income has been curtailed somewhat from the year 2001 onwards. 17 This reform could only have
an eﬀect in the last year of the sample period. We expect that households do not directly respond to such
reforms and hence the eﬀect is expected to be limited.
As we expected, the age spline coeﬃcient estimates are negative and diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero (χ2(6) =
34.7). So, each year the head of the household becomes older, the probability of having a mortgage decreases.
However, it is rather surprising that the size of the age eﬀects ﬂuctuates instead of becoming more strongly
negative when older. This result is in accordance with the age proﬁle that we saw in Figure 3.
The cohort splines are jointly signiﬁcant (χ2(6) = 36.2). The empirical evidence suggests that mortgage
ownership is a non-decreasing function of the year of birth up to 1946. If the head of the household was born
in 1937 the probability to be mortgage owner is 6%-points larger, relative to the households in which the head
was born in 1927. These results partly explain the cohort-time eﬀects observed in Figures 2 and 3. The size of
the positive cohort eﬀect diﬀers among generations.
Both the inﬂation rate and the logarithm of the house prices has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on mortgage
ownership. These are the indicators that correct for time eﬀects and should therefore pick up the business cycle.
If one expects higher inﬂation in the near future it becomes ﬁnancially attractive to take up a mortgage. Of
course we do not know whether current inﬂation can signal for future inﬂation expectations, though many studies
have found evidence of this (Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2006)). The eﬀect of inﬂation indeed appears to
be positive and signiﬁcant. A 1% increase in the house prices results in an increase in the mortgage ownership
rate by 0.14%-points. Possibly, this might imply that an increase in the house prices induce households to
cash the surplus value on their house by negotiating a mortgage again.18 Similar to the misspeciﬁcation test
on the cohort speciﬁc variables, we test whether the two time variables satisfactorily describe the time eﬀect.
Therefore, we include all time dummies to the model (results not displayed).19 The null hypothesis, which
states that the coeﬃcients corresponding to the time dummies are jointly equal to zero, cannot be rejected at
a 1% signiﬁcance level (χ2(9) = 11.50). This suggests that we eﬀectively capture most time eﬀects by means of
the inﬂation rate and the house price.
Besides the age, time and cohort eﬀects, it seems that average log(total income), our proxy for the permanent
income, signiﬁcantly contributes to the explanation of mortgage ownership. The eﬀect is however small: a 1%
increase enhances the probability to have a mortgage with 0.034%-points. Transitory income has no signiﬁcant
eﬀect. Furthermore, the results show that the number of years living in the current home does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the probability to have a mortgage. Finally, it appears that the probability to be mortgage owner is an
increasing function of the ratio of the house value and the average house price in the Netherlands.
5 Cohort eﬀects in mortgage ownership: a further analysis
In the home ownership models we are able to explain the cohort eﬀects. However, this is not true for the model
that considers mortgage ownership. Ideally, we would have liked to include generation speciﬁc variables to
describe those cohort eﬀects. However, relevant aggregate data are barely available. A second problem is that
the SEP does not contain much information about the mortgage contract. For instance we do not know when
the mortgages are taken out. Therefore, we resort to a more descriptive analysis to explain the cohort eﬀects
in mortgage ownership observed in the previous section. For this purpose, we use information from the DHS
data to discuss some of the issues that have arisen, or that we could not account for, in the previous section.
Contrary to the SEP, this DHS questionnaire includes questions about the residual duration of a mortgage,
bequest and savings motives and the popularity of several mortgage types.
17As of 2001, the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments is restricted to a maximum duration of 30 years. Moreover,
the interest can only be deducted if the mortgage is used for the ﬁnance of the house or home improvements and no longer for
consumption purposes.
18If we use the real interest rate instead of the inﬂation rate as a time speciﬁc variable, the estimation results remain rather
constant. It does hardly aﬀect the age and cohort eﬀects. The real interest rate itself has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on mortgage
ownership (see Van der Schors, Alessie and Mastrogiacomo (2007)).
19To avoid linear combinations, we need to drop four time dummies; year 1990 to 1993.
12Table 2: Mortgage ownership among home owners between age 50 and 80
coeﬃcient st.error
Inﬂation rate (as a %) 0.007 *** 0.002
Log(average house price) 0.136 *** 0.043
Years of living in the current home -0.001 0.001
Relative value of the house 0.008 * 0.005
Log (total income) -0.003 0.005
Log(income) 0.037 *** 0.012
Intermediate education 0.030 0.021
Higher vocational and university education 0.061 ** 0.024
Family size -0.004 0.009
Marital status (ref.group = single, never married)
Married (yes = 1 ) -0.110 0.090
Divorced (yes = 1) -0.088 0.110
Widow (yes = 1) -0.071 0.097
Sex (male = 1) -0.001 0.036
Age splines
50 to 55 -0.015 *** 0.004
55 to 60 -0.013 *** 0.005
60 to 65 -0.025 *** 0.005
65 to 70 -0.015 *** 0.006
70 to 75 -0.005 0.007
75 to 80 -0.016 *** 0.006
Birth cohorts splines
before 1927 -0.001 0.006
1927 - 1931 0.021 ** 0.011
1932 - 1936 -0.003 0.010
1937 - 1941 0.015 ** 0.008
1942 - 1946 -0.005 0.006
1947 - 1952 -0.021 *** 0.007
Constant -1.202 *** 0.398
N 11533
Joint signiﬁcance of (chi square test) :




Explanatory note: The model includes all ages between 50 and 80. *** = signiﬁcant at 1% conﬁdence level; ** =
signiﬁcant at 5% conﬁdence level; * = signiﬁcant at 10% conﬁdence level. The use of the real interest rate instead of
the inﬂation rate as a time speciﬁc variable does hardly aﬀect the results. The real interest rate itself has a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on mortgage ownership (see Van der Schors, Alessie and Mastrogiacomo (2007)).
Source: SEP, own computations.



























































Explanatory note: lowess smoothing has been used to determine the relation between age and remaining mortgage duration.
Source: DHS, own computations.
Figure 6 shows that for each age above 50, the number of years elapsed since the arrangement of the mortgage
is smaller in 2005 than in 1993: the diﬀerence is about three years. Although it cannot fully explain the cohort
eﬀect in mortgage ownership, the shift in the age of mortgage take up could be one of the candidate explanations.
This shift in the age of mortgage take-up might be explained by the fact that younger generation households
move more frequently than the old ones. An alternative explanation might be that in comparison with the
older generation younger cohorts have a higher tendency to ’re-mortgage’ their house after the completion of
the initial mortgage contract. From other data sources we get the impression that the last explanation is more
plausible. Statistics Netherlands (1999) for instance reports that in the third quarter of 1999 about 60 % of the
new mortgages were used to exploit the increase in the house value to buy other durable goods and to ﬁnance
stock market operations.
Although we cannot prove this directly, our speculation is strengthened by the fact that the increase in ﬁrst
mortgages is accompanied by a considerable rise in the number of home owners with a second mortgage.20 It
increases from almost zero to approximately 10% for the retired elderly (see ﬁgure 7) between 1993 and 2005.
Second mortgages are mostly used to cash the surplus value for other purposes. In the last waves 2003 till
2005 of the DHS-survey, home owners who cashed the surplus value were asked for what purpose they used the
mortgage loan. The majority of the respondents reports that they have employed their second mortgage for
home improvements (55%). Home improvements can be regarded as a way to increase the market value of the
house and also allow the home owner to enjoy an extra tax facility. Merely 18% of the respondents used it for
the purchase of durable goods. In other words, the use of housing wealth to ﬁnance consumption does not seem
to be very popular yet. It should be mentioned, however, that from 2001 onwards mortgage interest payments
are no longer tax deductible if the mortgage is used to ﬁnance durable expenditures (except for the purpose of
home improvement) or stock market operations.
Another explanation for the generational diﬀerences in mortgage ownership could be related to changes in
elderly’s attitude towards leaving a bequest. More often, parents realise that their children are well educated
and hence will be ﬁnancially well oﬀ. Therefore, younger generation parents could ﬁnd it less important to
bequeath their house to their children (Hurd (1990)). Instead, they can use the housing wealth to ﬁnance
consumption after retirement. The DHS-survey includes the following interesting question:
20One speaks of a second mortgage if a household indicates that it has two mortgage contracts outstanding on the same dwelling.
























































Explanatory note: lowess smoothing has been used to determine the relation between age and second mortgage ownership.
Source: DHS, own computations.
Please indicate which of the following four statements about parents leaving a bequest to their children, would
be closest to your own opinion about this.
1. If our children would take good care of us when we get old, we would like to leave them a considerable
bequest
2. We would like to leave our children a considerable bequest, irrespective of the way they will take care of us
when we are old.
3. We have no preconceived plans about leaving a bequest to our children because we want to enjoy our own
lives
4. We don’t intend to leave a bequest to our children, because we don’t want to do that
5. NONE of the above-mentioned statements
It should be noted that more than 60 % of the respondents selects the third option indicating that many
respondents do not ﬁnd it important to leave a bequest (cf. answer category three). Their bequests would
mostly be accidental. We compare the answers to this question in 1993 with 2003 by looking at elderly (55+)
home owners. It appears that between 1993 and 2003, the fraction of home owners with an accidental bequest
motive increased signiﬁcantly (from 57 % to 64 %). This result suggests that leaving a bequest has become a
slightly less important saving motive.
Finally, ﬁnancial innovation could have contributed to the increase in the mortgage ownership rate. We see
that this increase is accompanied by an increase in the popularity of the interest-only mortgage. Whereas in
1993 30% of all elderly mortgage owners between 60 and 70 years old had an interest-only mortgage, this share
has risen to 50% in 2005. This large increase is mirrored in the reduction of the annuity mortgage. It is unclear
how the increase in the interest-only mortgage relates to the increase in mortgage ownership in general; the
causality could be in both directions. In future research it would be interesting to analyse the elderly’s choice
for this speciﬁc mortgage type.
156 Summary and Conclusion
In this study we have investigated home and mortgage ownership of the Dutch elderly. In the descriptive analysis,
we establish that among the elderly there are considerable generational diﬀerences in the home ownership rate.
We have developed an econometric model which, among other things, can be used to explain those cohort
eﬀects. Even after correction for important background characteristics such as income and education level,
cohort eﬀects remain important. The main factor explaining the generational diﬀerences in home ownership is
by the level of GDP per capita when the household head was about 25 years old. This cohort speciﬁc variable
has been included in order to account for generational diﬀerences in permanent income. However, if we take
the whole sample into account it appears that the supply of new owner-occupied and rented houses per capita
between the age of 20 and 30 aﬀect home ownership. Interestingly, the situation at the housing market does
no longer explain generational diﬀerences when looking at the households above age 50 in particular. These
highly deviating results suggest that interaction eﬀects between cohort and age eﬀects play an important role.
In future research the existence of such interactions should be explored in more detail using a larger dataset
such as the Income Panel Survey (IPO - this is an administrative dataset collected by Statistics Netherlands).
Our results suggest that during retirement home ownership decreases with age. It might be worthwhile to
investigate this further using a transition model (Tatsiramos (2004)). Again, data from IPO might prove useful
here, since transitions out of home ownership to nursing homes are relevant when observing elderly. Such a
study is not possible with SEP because households in institutions like nursery homes are excluded from the
sample frame.
The fraction of elderly home owners that has a mortgage debt has also increased considerably during the
nineties. Around age 60 the mortgage ownership is much higher for home owners born around 1935 relative to
those born around 1930. This diﬀerence amounts to 20%-points. Instead of modelling the cohort eﬀects, we
explain the time eﬀects by including two time speciﬁc variables, namely house prices and the inﬂation rate. It
appears that both variables capture most of the time eﬀects. The cohort splines in the econometric model are
jointly signiﬁcant indicating that cohort eﬀects should be take into account in explaining mortgage ownership.
A supplementary analysis has been performed in order to gain a better understanding of the causes underlying
this residual cohort and time eﬀects. It appears that among the retirees the accidental motive to leave a bequest
has become more important during the nineties. Moreover, ﬁnancial innovation, residual mortgage duration
and the take up of second mortgages all contribute to explain the increase of mortgage ownership of the elderly,
though their eﬀect is not always unambiguous. The supplementary analysis presented in the paper is rather
descriptive. A more thorough multivariate analysis seems to be necessary. Nevertheless, our analysis show that
both time and cohort eﬀects contribute to the explanation of the strongly increased mortgage ownership among
elderly home owners.
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